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Forward 
 This paper is our attempt to focus the ongoing debate in Canada about the federal 
regulation of charities. More precisely, the paper examines the desirability of having an 
independent federal body assume some of the key roles which Revenue Canada currently plays in 
the charity field, as well as offering ideas about that body’s structure and operations. 
 
 The paper postulates the creation of an independent body having as its primary role the 
right to determine which organizations will be registered as charities for Income Tax Act purposes 
only.  As a concomitant, that body would decide which organizations lose their registered status 
for failing to continue to meet the statutory and administrative requirements of the tax system. 
Both of these powers are now exercised by the Charities Division of Revenue Canada.1 
 
 We have attempted identify  the legislative and structural  options and requirements for 
that kind of body. We do this to allow interested parties to move beyond the need to debate 
whether that a body should be created and, instead, focus on the mechanics involved in 
structuring it. Of course, the structuring must take into account a wide range of policy decisions. 
We hope that this paper will further the discussion about how this function should be structured 
and why.  
 
 While some will undoubtedly disagree, we believe that the question of the need for 
change from the status quo is beyond debate. In the paper entitled Working Together: A 
Government of Canada/Voluntary Sector Joint Initiative2 the members of what has come to be 
called the “Joint Tables” put forward three options for changes in the system of federal charity 
oversight. The recommendations and discussion will be found in Appendix A to this paper. 
 
                                                          
1 In this paper, we shall continue to use the term “Revenue Canada”, “the department” and similar terms 
notwithstanding the fact that we are well aware that as of November 1, 1999, Revenue Canada will cease to 
exist and we will have substituted therefore the Canada Customs and Revenue Agency (CCRA). 
Obviously, nobody really knows what changes, if any, may occur as a result of the new status of the tax 
authority in Canada. But there has never been a hint of a suggestion that the Charities Division will operate 
any differently under the new corporate structure than it has up to now.  
 
2 The paper is dated August 1999 but was issued in mid-September. It can be found on the internet at 
www.pco.bcp.gc.ca/prog_e.htm or at www.web.net./vsr-trsb. The paper is a compilation of 
recommendations put together by three “Tables”, each of which was comprised of a number of senior 
federal bureaucrats and representatives of the charity community. It is expected to be the focus of an 
extended debate on the relationship between the federal government and the voluntary sector. 
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 In essence, there are three options suggested. The first is to retain the status quo: all 
power continues to reside with Revenue Canada, albeit with some changes to make the process a 
more open one, aided and abetted by “a committee of knowledgeable individuals”. 
 
 The second option would see the creation of an “Agency” to “complement” Revenue 
Canada’s role by offering advice and to “nurture and support charities and other voluntary 
organization and provide information to the public.” This option was based on recommendations 
in the Broadbent Report3 
 
 The third option creates a “a quasi-judicial” Commission which would “undertake most 
of the functions currently carried on by the Charities Division”. The concept also sees the 
Commission as providing authoritative advice to the voluntary sector. 
 
 The Table Report indicates that when the three options were considered, Table members 
representing the voluntary sector all opted for the Commission model while the government 
representatives were of the opinion that any of the three models would work. 
 
As noted, the purpose of this paper is to identify the legislative and structural  options and 
requirements for that kind of body; it is not to debate which of the models might best serve 
Canada. We take the position that there is no viable option to the establishment of a Commission-
like body.4  Indeed, in our view, the “Agency” option is a complete non-starter because it is 
perceived as simply adding a level of additional bureaucracy to the current system without 
creating a body with any power. As independent decision-makers, advisory boards in Ottawa are 
usually notoriously ineffective, and, most often, perceived to be captured creatures, serving only 
as part of the government’s public relations exercise.5 
                                                                                                                                                                             
 
3 Building on Strength: Improving Governance and Accountability in Canada’s Voluntary Sector, 
published in February 1999. It was produced by the Panel on Accountability and Governance in the 
Voluntary Sector, chaired by Ed Broadbent and initiated by the Voluntary sector Roundtable. 
 
4 We have chosen the term Charity Tribunal to distance the consideration of this option of an independent 
decision-making body under the Income Tax Act from unnecessary comparisons – both in the positive and 
negative aspects – with the Charity Commission of England and Wales. The focus must be on the Canadian 
requirements for this function. 
 
5 A report published by the Fraser Institute entitled Preserving Independence: Does the Canadian 
Voluntary Sector need a Voluntary sector Commission (April, Clemens and Francis) vociferously attack the 
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 We also take the position that organizational changes are extremely difficult, if not 
impossible.  We do not believe that it is prudent to try to counteract the problems inherent in 
having a department dedicated to maximizing tax revenues make social policy decisions, 
particularly where a decision to recognize an organization as charitable de facto implies a loss of 
tax revenue. The Table Report suggestions of incremental changes to meet currently perceived 
problems smack of slapping a new coat of paint on a house which is structurally unsound.6 
 
 For these reasons, we are committed to what we are calling the Charity Tribunal.  And 
having now acknowledged the basis for our position, we provide the guidelines within which we 
are working. 
 
1.  In our view, neither the Broadbent Report nor the Joint Table Report, gives enough 
attention to the constitutional problems inherent in the fact that prima facie, in Canada 
the law of charity is a matter of provincial jurisdiction, though sparsely exercised.7 In 
fact, with the exception of Ontario and Alberta8 the provinces are almost completely 
inactive in exercising their powers of oversight in the voluntary sector. As a result and 
though without direct jurisdiction,  through its use of the provisions of the Income Tax 
Act the federal government has effectively become the main player in the field, forcing 
                                                                                                                                                                             
concept as set out in the Broadbent report. Strangely, it relies to a great extent on a British Parliamentary 
Committee Report which was critical of the recent performance of the English and Wales Charity 
Commission. But at least insofar as the table Report is concerned, the Broadbent suggestion stands in 
juxtaposition to the notion of a Commission, not as a replica. 
 
6 Of course, Revenue Canada is not without its supporters. Blake Bromley in a paper delivered to the 
Pacific Business and Law Institute on May 20, 1999 entitled Table Talk: Dumbing-Down The Law of 
Charity in Canada comes to the defence of Revenue Canada.  
 
7 Section 92 of the British-North America Act states: 
 
“92. In each Province the Legislature may exclusively make Laws in relation to Matters 
coming within the Classes of Subjects next hereinafter enumerated; that is to say, 
…. 
7. The Establishment, Maintenance, and Management of Hospitals, Asylums, Charities, and Eleemosynary 
Institutions in and for the Province, other than Marine Hospitals.” 
 
The subject is also discussion in the Report on the Law of Charities (1996) by the Ontario Law Reform 
Commission at page 5. 
 
8 Ontario through an active (some say overactive) Office of the Provincial Guardian and Trustee and 
Alberta in legislation relating to fundraising. 
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charities to meet certain legislated standards in order to maintain their ability to give tax 
relief for donations. 
 
This paper proposes that an independent body be established to make a limited range of 
decisions about getting and losing status a charity under the Income Tax Act. The Charity 
Tribunal would, ab initio, have very limited jurisdiction. We are assuming that it should 
not have powers which trench on those of the provinces, whether or not those powers are 
exercised. And we are assuming that only after the Tribunal is well-established in its 
primary roles of registering and deregistering charities and having a role in the appeal 
process will consideration be given expanding it role to encompass, for example, the role 
of nurturer and advisor to the sector. 
 
2.  For this paper, we accept the group of assumptions which are adopted in the Joint Table 
Report. These include: 
 
• The appeals process would be reformed. All three models contemplate the need 
for administrative, quasi-judicial and judicial review, the potential for greater 
access to appeals, and a richer accumulation of expertise by adjudicators. This 
would guide both the sector and those who administer this complex area of law. 
 
• Confidentiality restrictions around the registration process would be eased. 
 
• Any body mandated to oversee the sector should have sufficient resources and 
expertise to develop policy, educate and communicate. 
 
• There would be greater effort to foster knowledge of the rules and ensure 
compliance with them, including institution of intermediate penalties. 
 
We particularly want to stress the second-last point. It will (and has been) argued that 
many of the perceived failings of Revenue Canada’s Charities Division stem from a lack 
of resources available which precludes it doing its job well.9 While we accept that it is 
normally easier to do well with more resources than with less resources, we believe that 
                                                                                                                                                                             
 
9 In a paper entitled Regulating Virtue: A Purposive Approach to the Administration of Charities in Canada 
delivered at a conference at the University of Toronto in January, 1999, Lorne Sossin, of Osgoode Hall 
Law School indicated that the Charities Division had 71 fulltime employees (FTE) in 1997 but was 
expected to have 133 in 1998. The data was contained in a letter to Sossin from Revenue Canada. 
(Hereinafter, this paper is referred to as Sossin. It will be published as part of a conference report in late 
1999 or early 2000.) 
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the current problems with Revenue Canada’s administration of the charity portfolio are 
not solely due to a lack of funding. They are, for the most part, structural, resulting from 
the conflicting roles of a tax collector and what can be described as adjudicator without 
jurisdiction. 
 
Having said that, we believe that there is no point in creating a Tribunal (or indeed 
adopting either of the other two options) if there is not going to be sufficient funding.  
 
3.  Finally, we would like to make some observations about The Charity Commission for 
England and Wales.  
 
The English Commission is a body which merits close examination by anybody who 
wants to import the concept of an independent decision maker into Canada. It’s role in 
England and Wales would encompass what we have in Canada as the joint roles of 
Revenue Canada plus the provinces if they exercised their jurisdiction plus a kind of 
advisory, nurturing body of the type envisaged for the Agency concept in the Joint Table 
Report.10 
 
The Commission works extremely well within its context 11 but that context is not 
Canada. It is our view that we can learn much about how a Canadian version of the 
Commission should operate from studying the England and Wales model but at the same 
time we believe that it is both impossible and undesirable to try to replicate that model in 
Canada. We make frequent references to how the Commission operates in this paper, not 
because we take those examples as determinative but because we think they offer ideas 
and options which are useful in designing the Charity Tribunal .  
 
                                                          
10 The former Chief Commissioner, Richard Fries,  gave a speech in 1999 which outlined the current 
workings of the Commission. The speech was given in Budapest at a conference and is reproduced in full 
in Volume 2, #1 of the International Journal for Not-for-Profit Law at 
http://www.icnl.org/journal/vol2iss1/rfries.htm. 
 
11 However, the Twenty-Eighth Report (1997-98) of the House of Commons Committee on Public 
Accounts entitled The Charity Commission Regulation and Support of Charities (The Stationery Office, 
London, 1998) is a tough-toned critique of the efficiency of the Commission. But judging by the 
Commission’s statistical record, it remains, criticized or not, much more efficient in dealing with the public 
than is the Charity Division of Revenue Canada. 
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Introduction and Background 
 
 The road which had led us to the point where a Tribunal to replace the Charities 
Division has been a long one, and not as direct as some might suppose. From the early 
1970’s until the mid-to-late 1980”s, the working relationship of the charity community 
with the Charities Division was excellent. The Division was efficient: applications were 
handled expeditiously and there seemed to be an attitude of co-operation between the 
Division of the practitioners. At a time when Revenue Canada was in ill-odour (1983-84) 
12, many believed that the Charities Division was far and away the best run and most 
respected in the Department.  
 
 But during the last part of the 1980’s, there appeared to be a change in attitude at 
the Division which resulted an increasing resort to the Courts.  This quickly revealed that 
the law of “what is a charity” was more restricted than most people had understood it to 
be.13 And the rules as to what was “acceptable” behaviour for charities, most notable on 
the educational/advocacy/political continuum, developed in an extremely restrictive 
manner. 
 
 The cases won by charitable organizations were for the most part considered to 
be legal anomalies.14 In more recent years there has been an increase in cases where there 
                                                          
12 During this period, the Department was subject to constant attack on everything from having “quotas” 
for auditors to its treatment of artists. In the 1983-84 period, virtually the entire senior bureaucracy was 
purged and comparative outsiders brought in. It was the flak surrounding the department’s abusive 
behaviour which led to the issuing of the “Taxpayer’s Bill of Rights”.  
 
13 During this time we had such cases as Scarborough Community Legal Services, Polish Canadian 
Television Production, Positive Action Against Pornography, Toronto Volgograd Committee, NDG 
Neighbourhood Association and Canada Uni…most of which, experts agree, would have been recognized 
as charitable in England but were not so recognized by the Canadian Federal Court of Appeal. 
 
14 Most notable of these was Native Communications which could have been a seminal case but which the 
Courts turned into an “Indian” case with limited application.  
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have been deregistrations, not just a refusal to register, based, for the most part, on a 
narrow  reading of what is meant by the term “political activities”. 15 
 
 For those working with and arguing the developing Canadian case law, it became 
apparent that England (presumably the source of the common law for the Canadian courts 
and Revenue Canada) was home to a more responsive approach to both definition and 
activities, one that recognized that charity is a living thing.  This appeared to be so 
because since 1960, the decisions on most of the crucial areas were made primarily by the 
Charity Commission of England and Wales, and not the British tax officials. And the 
decisions of the Commission were not much challenged, so that while the law in England 
was changing de facto, there was no reported body of court cases to which Canadian 
judges could to look as precedents.16 
 
 It is probably fair to say that until the mid-1990’s, there was little if any Canadian 
understanding of, or interest in, the concept of a charity commission. But after the string 
of courtroom losses and a backlog of decisions on hard cases, the difference between 
Canadian and English law became so striking that some began to think that the “answer” 
to the problem of a narrow definition of the term “charity” might lay in the creation of a 
Tribunal.17 
 
                                                          
15  The first of these was the Briarpatch case. Subsequently we had decisions in Human  Life International 
(Canada)and Alliance For Life which severely narrowed the scope of a charity’s “political” activities. 
 
16  The most striking examples is that by an internal decision, the Charity Commission decided to recognize 
as charitable organizations which had as their objects the improvement of race relations. Not only has 
Canada not followed suit but  in the Supreme Court majority decision in Vancouver Society of Immigrant 
and Visible Minority Women, Mr. Justice Frank Iacobucci said: 
 “As the matter is not in issue, I would decline to comment as to whether the elimination of 
prejudice and discrimination may be recognized as a charitable purpose”. 
 
That comment, in the context of a Canadian multi-cultural society, was probably a key element in 
convincing many that steps had to be taken to revisit the system as a whole, because the courts were not 
going to offer any help or hope. 
 
17  In our view, this “scope problem” is intimately linked to the time it takes to process applications, 
especially the hard cases.  The Charities Division faces is part of the tax collection administration and has 
neither the mandate nor the institutional culture to enable it to allow the law charities to be responsive to 
changing landscape of the daily aims and operations of modern charities. 
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 In 1995, the Department of Canadian Heritage 18 commissioned Arthur Drache to 
do a paper examining the possibility of importing the commission concept to Canada. 
This paper was subsequently published 19 and the idea was put into intellectual play 
within the voluntary sector.  
 
 The core to the concept of a Canadian charity Tribunal is that it would be in a 
position to interpret the common law (as does the English version) and any legislative 
initiatives from a independent perspective, rather than from within a framework that 
gives priority to the collection of taxes. 
 
 The process leading to this the current call for a tribunal was accelerated in 1999. 
The decision of the Supreme Court of Canada in the Vancouver Society of Immigrant and 
Visible Minority Women 20 offered the most meagre gruel for those who had hoped for a 
judicial expansion of the “definition” of charity. And to make matters worse, the Court 
clearly put the ball back in the court of the legislature, refusing (after some very kind 
comments) to impose a newly suggested approach argued for by the Canadian Centre For 
Philanthropy,  an intervenor. So the Court as a possible source of reform had opted out. 
 
 The Broadbent Report, which had been withheld pending the decision of the 
Supreme Court in the Vancouver case was published the following month. It was a wide-
                                                          
18  This Department had federal jurisdiction over “volunteerism”. In addition, many of its “client” groups 
found that they could not be registered as charities which in turn made fundraising difficult. This became a 
crucial issue at the time the paper was commissioned because of government funding cutbacks to the 
voluntary sector generally. 
 
19  The English Charity Commission Concept in the Canadian Context, The Philanthropist, Volume 14, #1 
@ page 8.   It is ironic that the author and those who commissioned him were looking at the 
concept of a Canadian Charity Commission as a method to bring about a more enlightened 
“definition” of what is charitable and a more generous approach to what are acceptable activities. 
In the end result, while the concept of a Commission remains very attractive, the definition 
problem seems to be a secondary purpose. There is a growing feeling that at least for Income Tax 
Act purposes, some sort of expanded listing of “acceptable” organizations should be legislated 
and some of the court imposed limitations on activities should also be dealt with legislatively. 
This last concept has been dealt with by Drache in a paper produced under the auspices of The Kahanoff 
Foundation entitled Charities, Public Benefit and the Canadian Income Tax System. The Table Report 
makes more limited recommendations regarding definition (suggesting legislating an additional six 
categories by way of Income Tax Act amendment as well as trying to offer a “solution” to the 
education/advocacy/political activity issue. 
 
20  [1999] 1 S. C. R.10; [1999] 2 C. T. C. 1; 99 D. T. C. 5034 
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ranging paper which stimulated discussion, not the least of which revolved around its 
version of the English Charity Commission. In our view the paper suffers from real 
problems in identifying jurisdictional boundaries and in having what we believe to be a 
naive approach as to what could be achieved through institutional changes at the Revenue 
Canada..21 As noted in the forward to this paper, it appears that the Broadbent suggestion 
of an “Agency” as a buffer between the government and the sector appears ill-
conceived.22 
 
 The creation of the “Joint Table” group comprised of both senior government and 
sector representatives attests, we believe, to the fact that all sides realize that the status 
quo is unacceptable and that the traditional ways of working out legal issues is not 
working and will not work. It is our belief that the fact that the Commission concept was 
unanimously embraced by the voluntary sector representatives of the Tables while the 
civil servants remained neutral amongst the three options simply shows that the sector 
people have been living with the issues and problems for a much longer time than have 
the bureaucrats. 
 
 With this background to the genesis of the Tribunal idea, we now turn to an 
examination of the reasons why as a generality, the tax authorities should not be the 
people to make decisions about whether an organization does or does not qualify for tax 
concessions based on their status as a charity. 
                                                          
 
21 The members of the panel appeared to have a degree of trust in Revenue officials and their goodwill 
which is not matched by many in the sector. 
 
22  This is what we take to be the essence of the Fraser Institute’s objection to what Broadbent calls the 
Voluntary Commission. In fact, the Fraser Report endorses the idea of an independent panel, armed with updated 
directions from Parliament, the concept advanced here. See footnote 4 at p 28 and p 33  
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The Tax Authority As Decision Maker 
 
 In this part of the paper, we shall look at the main issues which arise when  tax 
authorities are given this power, most of which come into play when considering the role 
of Revenue Canada, both past and future. 
 
 In many countries around the world, the tax authority is the decision maker for 
determining the sorts of organizations which are recognized as “charitable” (or as public 
benefit organizations or whatever term is used in the particular country) for tax purposes. 
And while the scope of tax benefits may vary from country to country, the fundamental 
question - whether it is appropriate of tax officials to make what amounts to a 
fundamental social policy decision - is being questioned. 
 
International Experience 
 
 The issue has arisen in such diverse countries as New Zealand, Scotland,23 
Singapore, South Africa24 and in many European nations, both east and west. While the 
issue is framed in  different ways, a common consideration is the desirability of a “charity 
commission”. While many countries look to the Charity Commission of England and 
Wales as a model, many others have doubts about adopting this specific approach. But 
what all approaches do have in common is the basic premise that the tax authorities are 
not the proper ones to decide on policy matters relating to status. 
 
 An interesting confirmation of the concept of a charity commission was its broad 
endorsement at a conference held in May, 1999 in Budapest…much to the surprise of 
many participants. It happened at a workshop held under the sponsorship of the 
                                                          
23 See The regulation of Charities in Scotland by S. R. Moody, senior Lecturer in Law, University of 
Dundee, published in issue #4 of the International Journal of Not-For-Profit Law accessible at 
http://www.icnl.org/journal/vol1iss4/index.html 
 
24 See The Ninth Interim Report of the Commission of Inquiry into Certain Aspects of  the Tax Structure of 
South Africa (more commonly called the Katz Report) which can be found at: 
http://www.icnl.org/journal/vol1iss3/index.html 
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International Center For Not-For-Profit Law, which brought together a smallish (60) 
group of lawyers and bureaucrats involved with non-profits from across Europe. 
 
The conference was titled European Civil Society in the 21st Century: Standards 
and Mechanisms for regulating “Public Benefit” Organizations.25 One of the four 
working groups at the conference was on the topic of “Appropriate Decision Makers”. 
There were intensive meetings which ran for two full days which had representatives 
from eleven countries, most of them east European but including one each from Italy, 
Germany and England. 
 
There were four basic approaches identified which are used to determine which 
organizations are recognized as being “charities” or public benefit organizations. These 
are the courts (Hungary), the tax authorities, (several) a charity commission (England and 
perhaps in the near future, Poland) and other (non-tax) government departments. Initially, 
it was apparent that representatives from each country thought their system was the ideal 
 
The participants then used a sort of matrix (not unlike that used in the final 
Report of the Tables), setting out the characteristics of an ideal system. These included 
such items as “fairness”, “speed”, “cost”, consistency”, “political interference”, “societal 
values” and “appeal options”, to name some of the key considerations. Then each of the 
four basic approaches was rated against these characteristics, using a discussion/voting 
approach. To the surprise of many, the upshot was that the concept of a charity 
commission came out far ahead. 
 
Obviously, the conclusions did not take into account the “political realities” in 
each country but this arguably made them more valuable, given that a consensus emerged 
amongst experts about the “ideal”, even if that ideal might be a “non-starter in their own 
countries. 
 
 Some countries have taken a part of that jurisdiction away through legislating 
more precise definitions in various statutes…countries as diverse as Barbados and 
                                                          
25 A full issue of the International Journal of Not-For-Profit Law has been devoted to this conference. It is 
in Volume 2, # 1 and can be found at http://www.icnl.org/journal/vol2iss1/ 
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Hungary. The moves are designed to at least partially limit decision-making by tax 
authorities. This approach was recommended by the final Table Report 26 though it is 
presented in a fashion which does not specifically state that the need for such legislation 
stems directly from the failings of Revenue Canada and the Courts as social policy 
decision makers 
 
Why The Tax Authority is Not Appropriate 
 
 We now turn to a general discussion of why the tax authority is not generally the 
appropriate decision-maker, as a matter of social policy, to determine what types of 
organizations should receive tax benefits. 
 
1. The officials who work in tax authorities are trained to raise taxes.  The culture in 
which they work has an innate bias which leads employees to try to maximize tax 
revenue. Giving them the authority to accept or reject to an application that may produce 
significant tax revenue loss puts it in a conflict situation. The 1999 decision of the 
Supreme Court of British Columbia, Blair Longley v. M. N. R., demonstrates exactly the 
problem. 27  One of the contributing factors in the Longley decision was the secrecy 
surrounding the work done within Revenue Canada.28 
 
                                                          
26 Page 52. 
 
27  1999 Carswell BC 1657. Blair Longley came up with a scheme under which people could make 
payments to a registered political party and then have the funds flowed back for their personal benefit. He 
asked the tax authorities for an opinion on the scheme and was told that it was not legal. The case reports 
that there was an internal legal that the scheme was legal, albeit exploiting a loophole in the drafting of the 
tax legislation. 
 
In due course, Longley alleged that he had been misled by officials and brought action. In the end result, he 
was awarded damages for the “public misfeasance” by the Revenue officials which included $50,000 as 
“punitive damages”.  In our view this case represents, in part, the problem of institutional bias against tax 
expenditures. 
 
28 One of the problems faced by charities which appeal Revenue Canada decisions is that they do not have 
the right to use the discovery process to depose Revenue officials or call them as witnesses under oath so 
that matter of personal bias or worse can almost never be brought out in a court proceeding. In non-charity 
cases, Revenue officials are routinely examined both through discovery and as witnesses in open court. 
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2. A second element relates to the role of tax authorities in enforcing compliance. 
While tax authorities put out huge amounts of information to the public and spend 
millions of dollars on communication, the thrust of their efforts is to promote compliance 
with the law. You don’t go to the tax authorities for advice about how to reduce tax 
liabilities or for their approval of tax reduction ideas. 
 
This is equally the case of the Charities Division. It is extremely helpful in advising 
charities and non-profits about compliance, clearly one of the Division’s functions. But 
this should not be confused with any sort of “nurturing” role. Both the Broadbent report 
and the Table report, to a lesser extent, sees a new body which “helps” or “advises” 
charities, presumably to meet their charitable goals and to assist them to operate in an 
efficient manner. This is not a function which can or should be given to a division of a 
department, the role of which is to efficiently collect tax and to promote compliance. 
 
3. Most officials in tax authorities have no formal training or background geared to 
the decision making necessary to determine the legal nature of a charity.  29 Individuals 
may be lawyers, accountants or have related professional or educational qualifications.  
But there is no requirement that they have any specific educational or occupational 
background when they join the Charities Section. Individuals are not social policy makers 
nor are they trained to make social policy.  The corporate culture in which they operate 
makes it easier for them to say “no” rather than to say “yes”.30 In a milieu where success 
is measured in part by increasing the efficiency of tax collection and maximizing that 
function, it is to be expected that exemptions from tax will be granted reluctantly.31 
                                                          
29 Sossin, supra note 9, describes the “on the job training” at page 17 of his paper. 
 
30  In a conversation with an official from Inland Revenue in England who deals with the issue of charities 
and the tax system, the following point was made. In Scotland, which is not subject to the jurisdiction of 
the Charity Commission of England and Wales, Inland Revenue maintains an “index” of charities for tax 
purposes, making decisions based on the common law as to which organizations qualify. The official told 
us that the Inland Revenue officials in Scotland were unhappy with having this jurisdiction because they 
are not trained for it, and expressed hope that the review of the overall situation which is now under way in 
Scotland would result in Inland revenue being stripped of what it views as a onerous obligation. 
 
31  In a 1999 Press Release  designed to counter some false information which appeared in the media, 
Revenue provided this data: 
 
 Year  Applications Received Applications Approved 
 1992-93 3,900 3,300 
 1993-94 4,400 3,500 
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4. In most countries, the tax authorities are administrators and do not write the tax 
codes. In Canada, Finance writes the law and Revenue Canada administers it. This raises 
a number of problems because the policy makers are not the administrators. There have 
been instances in the recent past where substantial tax changes relating to charities have 
been put in place by Finance without informing Revenue. Conversely, there is evidence 
that Revenue has often requested tax changes which Finance refuses to co-operate in.32 
 
Simplifying administration is important to tax authorities, and the fewer exceptions there 
are to the general tax regime, the better it is.33 
 
In the hierarchy of government, Finance is the dominant department and Revenue is 
subservient insofar as policy making is concerned. Charity issues are a minute aspect of 
the inter-relationship. Many believe that the giving responsibility of charity 
administration to a new body which will be pre-eminent at the federal level and which 
would have direct access to Parliament would result in better and more expeditious tax 
legislation than is currently the case. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                             
 1994-95 3,900 3,300 
 1995-96 5,000 4,500 
 1996-97 4,300 2,800 
 1997-98 4,800 3,000 
 
 
 These figures show  that in 1992-93, 84.6% of applications were successful. In 1993-94, the rate 
of success dropped to 79.5%. 1994-95, saw the rate back to 84.6%, with the actual number of applications 
and registrations being identical to the 1992-93 figure, notwithstanding the fact that the department often 
talks about the increasing volume of applications. In 1995-96, we hit a high water mark for applications, 
5,000 of which 90% are accepted. Then we see the big change. In 1996-97, only 65% of applications are 
accepted and in 1997-98 the percentage drops to 62.5%. 
 
 These figures probably do not include applications which were abandoned without formality on 
the basis of initial negative reactions. 
 
32 This was alluded to in the Longley case where Finance refused to take steps to eliminate the “loophole” 
which caused Revenue’s administrative angst. 
 
33 This issue became very clear in the debates about exemptions which might be given when the Goods and 
Services Tax proposals were being debated. 
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5. Tax departments are large bureaucracies, with people moving from division to 
division with regularity . As an atypical part of a large department Charities Division can 
offer few opportunities for career advancement.  As a result, few remain long enough to 
develop expertise which significantly affects the quality of decision making.  
 
6. Most tax administrations, quite properly, operate on a system of extreme 
confidentiality about tax information. This imbues departmental employees with a 
secretive approach to their work. In our view, this is inappropriate in the context of 
dealing with many issues relating to charities.34 Unfortunately, this approach often 
carries over to such matters as guidelines to registration as non-profits, administrative 
issues and an unwillingness to publicly discuss issues which are of concern to the 
department and to the community. 
 
This issue was recognized by the government two years ago when there was some 
loosening of the confidentiality rules to allow some very limited public access to 
information.35 The Table Report also recommends a series of possible steps to try to 
make the working of the Charity Section more open. This is one of the changes the 
Tables contemplate when they talk about an “Enhanced Revenue Canada Charities 
Division”.36 
 
                                                          
34  For example, when there are public complaints about a charity, Revenue Canada is precluded from 
commenting on the particular charity and has to fall back on banal generalities. The English Charities 
Commission can and does speak out publicly about specific charities and often puts out press releases about 
them. It, of course is not bound by the same rules of confidentiality as are tax authorities. 
 
35  The first such step was taken more than 20 years ago, which allowed the public access to the public 
information returns of charities pursuant to subsection 149.1(15). The most recent changes are contained in  
subsection 241(3.2) which states: 
“An official may provide to any person the following taxpayer information relating to a charity that at any 
time was a registered charity: 
 (a) a copy of the charity's governing documents, including its statement of purpose; 
 (b) any information provided in prescribed form to the Minister by the charity on applying for registration 
under this Act; 
 (c) the names of the persons who at any time were the charity's directors and the periods during which they 
were its directors; 
 (d) a copy of the notification of the charity's registration, including any conditions and warnings; and 
 (e) if the registration of the charity has been revoked, a copy of any letter sent by or on behalf of the 
Minister to the charity relating to the grounds for the revocation.” 
 
36 See page 49 of the  Table Report. 
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The question which has to be posed is whether it is feasible to try to create an “open 
culture” for one very small section of Revenue Canada, while at the same time 
maintaining the necessary requirements of secrecy and confidentiality for all other parts 
of the Department. The simpler, and more efficient approach, is to put the decision 
making in a new body which is not bound by Income Tax Act notions of confidentiality 
but which has a specific statutory mandate to be open in its operations.37 
 
7. Lastly, there is the issue of appeals. When tax cases go to court, in almost every 
jurisdiction (including Canada) the onus is on the taxpayer to show that the tax authorities 
are wrong in their assessment. The courts start with an institutional bias against the 
appellant. While not a question of guilt, the onus often operates with that tenor and the 
applicant is presumed to be guilty until proved innocent. 38 
 
The problems of appeals is exacerbated by the facts that  the process is an appeal 39 to the 
Federal Court of Appeal. Not only is the onus on the charity or organization in question, 
but the basic rules applicable in the Tax Court of Canada such as the right to have 
examinations for discovery, call witness and cross examine the government’s decision 
makers, do not apply.  
 
In the Table Report 40, the problem of “appeals” is noted  as an issue to be put forward for 
consultation. In fact, of all the problems inherent in having the tax authority making 
decisions about charitable status, this problem could be most easily solved. We could 
return to a situation as we had before 1972 where the appeals go to a lower court, which 
                                                          
37  Realistically, no matter what sort of ultimate solution to the problem of jurisdiction is arrived at, there 
will remain some issues of confidentiality  on specific files. The thrust of the policy for a new organization 
however, should be that the public has a right to know unless there is an over-riding public policy to the 
contrary. This of course is in sharp contradistinction to the status quo. 
 
38  This applies to tax cases relating to charitable status as the Federal Court of Appeal recently confirmed 
in its decision in the Human Life (International) of Canada case. Ironically, in common law jurisdictions at 
least, in non-tax cases relating to charitable status, there is a presumption in favour of recognizing 
charitable status and intent. 
  
39  In England, if a body wishes to challenge the decision of the Charity Commission, one has a trial de 
novo, not an appeal from the decision. This approach results in different procedural issues coming into 
play, including one of “onus”. 
 
40 See page 63.  
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would not only make the process more accessible but would also make it more fair, but a 
statutory amendment could be put in place to resolve the “onus” issue. 
 
But the appeal issue can also be looked at in a completely new context if in fact a 
Tribunal replaces Revenue Canada as the arbiter of charitable status at the federal level. 
 
A General Point About The Delay In Processing Applications 
 
 To this point, we have been looking at the general issues involved in a tax authority 
making social policy decisions.  Before leaving this subject, however, we want to discuss a 
significant problem which is not necessarily related to decision-making authority.41  
 
 A problem faced by all those who make applications for charitable registered status with 
the Charities Division is the length of time it takes to have an application processed. We are not 
referring to the occasional contentious application which may take literally years to settle, one 
way or another, but the normal time it takes to handle the typical application, well as other routine 
matters. 
 
 Sossin 42 states that: “[t]he process typically takes between 7 and 15 months”, an 
observation which would probably be concurred in by most practitioners in Canada who have 
regular dealings with this sort of application.43  The problem is not just one of the obvious 
difficulties created for organizations which for the most part, are operational during the 
application process.  Under the Income Tax Act 44, an application is deemed to have been refused  
if the Minister has not given the applicant notification  of its disposition 180 days after the 
                                                          
41  Part of the problem invariably does have to do with the jurisdictional incapacity on the part of the 
Charities Division.  Some number of applications will raise novel or contentious matters for determination.  
That number cannot properly be considered by the Division.  There is either no clear law to apply or 
matters of mixed fact and law which need to be determinatively resolved.  Without a way to get a decision 
to administer, the Division has no recourse but to thoroughly consider the matter to try to make it fit or to 
deny the application.  The result is long periods of waiting by applicants and an intolerable position for 
administrators. 
 
42  Supra note 9 at page 16.  
 
43  In a conversation with Arthur Drache, Sossin said he got the information from a senior official in the 
Charities Division.  
 
44 Subsection 174(4)  
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application was filed. In fact, if it were not for applicant’s patience,  Revenue Canada’s 
administrative policies and the prohibitive cost of appealing a deemed refusal to register, the 
system as legislated would collapse into chaos. 
 
By way of comparison, in the 1998 Annual report of The Charity Commission of England and 
Wales, issued in mid-1999, we find the following statement: 
“During 1998 we responded to 93% of registration applications within 15 working days, and 94% 
of other correspondence within 20 working days.”  
 
 Other countries may have worse records than Canada 45 but it is crucial that those who 
are not regular users of the system be aware of just how slow it is, and to also be aware that the 
problem has been getting worse, not better. A decade or fifteen years ago, the normal wait would 
be measured in weeks, not months. No matter what the ultimate decision may be on the question 
of which body makes the registration decision, it is absolutely crucial that the process be made 
reasonably expeditious.46  
                                                          
45  We have been told that in India the process takes years, unless it is hurried along with bribes. One 
Canadian lawyer remarked that if bribes were a feasible option to speed up the Canadian process, he’d 
gladly pay them! 
 
46 It should be observed that all this is taking place in an era where citizens as consumers expect (and for 
many things) receive instant service.  Some provinces provide for  corporate registrations over the internet, 
measured in minutes.  Even without that method, the time taken is a short number of days. Taxpayers can 
e-file and get refunds in days.  Everywhere just-in-time service standards lead people to expect prompt, 
uncomplicated results. People motivated by altruistic notions of service are galled and distressed at their 
government to find that an “approval to do good” can take months and possibly be denied.  This frustration 
factor cannot justify inappropriate measures but it needs to be clearly borne in mind when assessing the 
problem and examining remedies. 
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The Role of The Tribunal 
 
 Before we consider how the proposed Tribunal should be structured, it is important to 
determine what its role should be. As any architect will attest, “form follows function”, and 
unless we have a clear idea of what the Tribunal should do, we cannot comfortably discuss how it 
should be organized. 
 
 There have been two models put forward in 1999. The first, contained in the Broadbent 
Report 47 was summarized as follows: 
• Provide support, information, and advice about best practices to voluntary organizations 
related to improving accountability and governance; 
• Collect and provide information to the public; 
• Evaluate and make recommendations on registration for new applicants; and 
• Assist organizations to maintain compliance with Revenue Canada and other regulatory 
requirements, and investigate public complaints.  
 
 The most striking aspect of this suggested role is that it give no real power to the 
Commission, and acts only in a advisory role to the Charity Division which keeps all the legal 
powers involved in registration and deregistration. While some have suggested that the 
recommendations of this body would carry significant weight with Revenue Canada, in 
practice, this is unlikely to be true because the Charities Division will always take the 
position that it must follow “the common law” and “the courts” and cannot allow the 
Agency’s recommendations to take priority.48 
 
                                                          
47 Page 58, with a summary at page 89. 
  
48 This view is bolstered by the experience associated with the National Arts Service Organization 
initiative where the decisions as to qualifications are made by the “Minister of Communications (now the 
Minister of Canadian Heritage) pursuant to subsection 149.1(6.4) of the Income Tax Act. Registration is to 
be by Revenue Canada. Very few such organizations have been registered since the inception of the 
concept in 1994, retroactive to 1990. Those involved in the field believe that Revenue Canada has applied 
its own standards to thwart the full implementation of the concept and that officials at Canadian heritage 
now “self-censor” applications because of problems they know Revenue will create for applications. 
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 Equally of concern to many organizations is that the Broadbent proposal would 
create another layer of bureaucracy and cost without appreciably improving the system. 
 
 The Report of the Tables, in discussing a Commission as one of three options, sees its 
role as: 
“A quasi-judicial commission would undertake most of the functions currently 
carried out by the Charities Division. It would provide authoritative advice to the 
voluntary sector, and expert adjudication of appeals on decisions by its Registrar. 
At the same time, such a commission would have a support function not unlike 
model B’s agency.49”  
 
  
 After considerable reflection, we have come to the conclusion that in the first 
instance, the role of the Tribunal should be even more narrow than as set out in the Table 
Report. We take the position that it should, at the start simply take over the current Revenue 
Canada role of registration and deregistration..50”  We consider that as desirable as many of 
the other roles may be, the effort involved in the shift of responsibilities and the development 
of new policies will be so demanding that no additional roles should be contemplated in the 
near term. 
 
 The question is not whether there should be a tribunal but among the number of things 
that need to be done after it is established, what should be priority. The Table Report has a 
number of recommendations.  At this stage, it is not clear which (if any) will be accepted and in 
what form. 
 
 For example, if the proposal to legislatively expand the list of organizations which are 
given “quasi charitable status”51 is accepted, one of the first jobs of the Tribunal will be to 
develop criteria for identifying qualifying organizations. Similarly, if the Table Report 
                                                          
49 The term “model B” refers to the Agency approach put forward in the Broadbent Report. 
 
50 See footnote 11. 
 
51 Page 52 of the Table Report 
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suggestions about the introduction of “intermediate sanctions” is accepted ,52 substantial work 
will have to be done to develop guidelines, not to mention work on an appeal process. 
 
 If the Table Report’s view that new approaches are needed to deal with issues such as 
“advocacy” and  “related business” is accepted, the Tribunal will have to develop rules and 
guidelines, whether or not there is a new legislative framework. 
 
 And of course, if one of the overall purposes of the creation of a Tribunal is to look at the 
whole issue of registration with fresh eyes, it will be incumbent on that body to review all of the 
Charity Division’s current interpretations and where necessary, make changes. 
 
 Given that one of the purposes of a shift from the Charities Division is to have a more 
open approach, a high priority will have to be given to the rewriting of the public documents 
currently used by Revenue Canada, the developing of new ones and the development of more 
open procedures and the taking of steps to increase accessibility to the system.  
 
 There will also have to be significant attention paid to the issue of an appeal system, not 
just in the context of the “intermediate sanction” proposals but also vis a vis refusals to register 
and deregistrations. There is a consensus that the current appeal system which starts at the Federal 
Court of Appeal cannot continue.53 But there is considerable work which must be done to develop 
an alternative. This work has to be done within the context of a shift from Revenue Canada 
control of the system to a Tribunal. 
 
 A couple of points should be made about the continuing role of Revenue Canada. It is our 
view that the audit function of charities should remain with Revenue Canada which continues to 
have to role of administering compliance with all aspects of the tax law. 54 We think that it only 
                                                          
52 Ibid page 58 
 
53 See, for example, the comments of the Table Report at page 55, one of the “shared assumptions” for all 
three of the models discussed in the report. 
 
54  We believe that an important precedent for much of what we are discussing here is the role of the 
Cultural Property Export Review Board. It has binding powers which have a direct financial impact on tax 
revenues and its role is recognized under the Income Tax Act. But through its relationship with Revenue 
Canada, investigatory powers are de facto vested in Revenue Canada through its audit and assessment 
procedures. The interplay of the Board, Revenue Canada, taxpayers, the courts and the various pieces of 
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makes common sense that Revenue should continue to effectively supervise the whole area of the 
tax treatment of charitable gifts as part of its assessing practices and given the inter-relationship 
of gifting and organizations, it would make little sense to say that the same department cannot 
look at the donee side of the equation as well as the donor side. 
 
 As will be suggested later in this paper, the audit side of Revenue would report to the 
Tribunal as to problems which it finds, but it would be up to the Tribunal to take the appropriate 
steps, whether in terms of “intermediate sanctions” or deregistration. When we discuss the issue 
of appeals, we will look at the role and status of Revenue Canada and we will be discussing the 
relationship between the Tribunal and the department with regard to operational issues, later in 
this paper. 
 
Conclusions about a Tribunal 
 
 The Tribunal will have considerable work on its plate in the first few years of operation, a 
burden which may or may not be increased by legislative initiatives as recommended by the 
Broadbent Report and the Table Report. We think it is unrealistic at the start to expect it to play 
any of the other roles which have been suggested for it. However, with the passage of time and 
the development of a smooth internal operation to deal with the primary matters under its 
jurisdiction, we would expect that its role would expand. 
 
 We would also expect that from the beginning, the Tribunal would play an informal role 
in transmitting sectoral concerns to government  (as through annual reports) as well as 
governmental concerns to the sector. Similarly, we would expect that fairly early on, steps would 
be taken to make contact with provincial authorities to see what level of co-operation might  be 
developed. 
 
 We stress that the final design of the Tribunal will depend to some extent on what 
changes if any are made to the Income Tax Act. While we think there is a need for a Tribunal 
whether we have the legislative status quo or legislative change, the nature of changes should 
have an impact on the design of the Tribunal and the people who are chosen to implement its 
policies. 
                                                                                                                                                                             
legislation which apply may be a partial model for the development of the new Tribunal and its various 
relationships. In Appendix C, we look at how the Cultural property Export Review Board works. 
 27 
Tribunal Members and Staff 
 
 One of the assumptions that both the Broadbent Report and the Table report made about a 
commission is that it would be “independent”. We suggest there are two distinct elements to this 
independence: accountability of the Tribunal within the our system of government and the 
manner of making appointments to the Tribunal. 
 
 One aspect is that the Tribunal should not be part of a government department and should 
not have to report to a cabinet minister. The ideal situation would be that the Tribunal make an 
annual Report to Parliament directly, as do, for example, The Auditor General or the Privacy 
Commissioner. 
 
 The relationship to Parliament and the government of the Tribunal may be developed and 
refined if some of the recommendations of the Table Report’s “capacity” proposals are adopted. 
If a minister or group of ministers is appointed to have responsibility for the voluntary sector at 
the federal level, if a secretariat is created and if a Parliamentary committee dealing with the 
voluntary sector is created 55 then it will be necessary to determine the interplay between the 
Tribunal and one or more of these bodies. But it seems to us that if the Tribunal is truly to be 
independent, then it must not be seen to be an arm of any of these suggested bodies or responsible 
to them. On the other hand, if, for example, the suggestion of the creation of a standing 
Parliamentary Committee is adopted, it would make sense that the Tribunal’s Annual Report to 
Parliament would be submitted to the Committee for review and comment. 
 
 A regular feature of the committee’s calendar might be the calling of key people from the 
Tribunal to “discuss” issues of importance to the sector. 
 
 If there is a Minister appointed for the voluntary sector, either formal or informal 
procedures could be adopted so that there can be an exchange of views. The same is true if a 
secretariat is created to deal with voluntary sector concerns, even if there is no single minister in 
charge. In England, for example, the Charity Commission has a relationship with the Attorney 
General and through that office will let government know when troubling or contentious issues 
                                                                                                                                                                             
 
55 Each of these idea is an idea or option referred to in the Table R, pages 25-27. 
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look to be arising.56 In so doing, the Tribunal would not to justify its actions or seek instructions 
but rather give the government an early indication of what it perceives to be problems that may be 
developing. This approach also allows the Tribunal and other government departments to co-
ordinate on issues of mutual concern.57 
 
Appointments to the Tribunal 
 
 There is another aspect of independence which has to be considered. This has to do with 
how Tribunal members are appointed. If we assume that they will be appointed by the 
government 58, how can an individual be seen to be independent? But it is unreasonable to assume 
that the government would pay the full cost of the Tribunal, have it established as a state 
functionary and allow the key appointments to be made by others. In any event, as the Broadbent 
Report 59 notes, the body should equally be independent of the sector. 
 
 The most common method of making appointments to federal boards, commissions and 
the similar bodies has two basic criteria. The first is to assume that there must be at least 
geographic, linguistic, gender and “ethnic” representation. This normally results in a fairly large 
board.  Some interest or knowledge in the subject is often a consideration, though, frequently 
there is no requirement for specialized knowledge. The second criterion is kinship with the party 
in power. This is understandable in most cases and probably there isn’t much harm done. 
 
 But in our view, given that the purpose of the Tribunal is to be a participant in a 
significant administrative and statutory reform of the federal law of charities, we do not believe 
that connections or broadly fashioned representation should be governing criteria. What is needed 
is a group of people who have some level of expertise (either from the legal, sectoral or 
                                                          
56 The process was explained in a private conversation with Kenneth Dibble, the head lawyer of the staff of 
the Charity Commission. 
 
57 There is a different and more direct relationship with Inland Revenue which will be discussed later in 
this paper. 
 
58 Presumably, by order-in-council. 
 
59 At page 63. 
 
 29 
government perspective) and who have an understanding of what the role of the Tribunal will be 
over both the short and long term. 
 
 If one were not limited by a need for geographic60 and other types of representation, the 
members of the Tribunal could be few in number. (England and Wales operates with just five 
commissioners, two of whom are “part time”)61 We also anticipate that one of the problems 
which will be faced is that small pool from which selections of qualified people could be made is 
small, especially when the potential of conflicts of interest comes is considered. 
 
 As a first step, we’d suggest that the appointment process for members of the Tribunal be 
initiated by application. We believe that the required positions should be advertised widely (not 
just a formal announcement in The Canada Gazette), together with the criteria. The selection of a 
number of qualified candidates to form the basis of a list of recommended appointees should be 
done by a neutral group, perhaps a body such as the Public Service Commission of Canada which 
has extensive experience in recruitment and replacement and is widely recognized for its 
impartiality. 
 
 The selection board (which could include some sitting deputy ministers and senior people 
from the sector) would base their choices on the usual criteria of job appointment, namely the 
qualities the individual has to do the job. Recommendations would then go to Cabinet which 
would consider them and appoint through an Order-In-Council. This process should also make 
removal of a Commissioner difficult, so the appointment would be for a term of years or “during 
good behaviour” but not “at pleasure”. 
 
 We believe that this (or a substantially similar) procedure would go a long way to 
ensuring that those appointed are independent of government, despite the fact that the funding of 
the Tribunal and its members salaries would be by government. 
 
                                                          
60 We believe that some thought should be given to having the Tribunal dispersed into several geographic 
areas. Having several offices may create some problems of co-ordination and consistency but it would 
remove the current feeling that the decision makers are both removed and remote from the applicants. 
 
61  See Schedule 1 of The Charity Act, 1993. There need be only three commissioners, though others may 
be appointed. At least two (of the three) must be lawyers. In fact, at the present time you have a career civil 
servant, a lawyer, a representative from the charity sector, an accountant and a law professor. They are 
deemed to be civil servants and are paid by the Crown. 
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 The appointment of the members of the Tribunal should also take into account their role. 
If the Tribunal is created and there were no change in the Income Tax Act relating to the 
“definition” of charities, the members of the Tribunal would have to have a high level of legal 
expertise, as would at least some of their support staff .  If, on the other hand, there were 
substantive changes to the federal tax law relating to definition, one could more easily have 
Tribunal members whose backgrounds were less law oriented and who could bring experience 
from various parts of the sector. 
 
 In our view the drafting of criteria and job descriptions becomes crucial to the selection 
process. Therefore one way to retain independence and to ensure competence, aside and apart 
from the process, is to create statutory guidelines or limits on the filling of the positions. 
 
 In Appendix B, we offer two existing statutory models which are designed to focus the 
characteristics required of appointees to ensure competence levels. Section 3 of The Standards 
Council of Canada Act is designed to ensure federal, provincial and sectoral representation on the 
Board.  Subsection 6(2) uses general language to try to ensure a level of expertise and breadth of 
representation on the Board. 
 
 While the Joint Tables seemed disposed to the Standard Council’s structure as a model, 
we are taken with the structure of the Cultural Property Review Board. As noted elsewhere here, 
this Board actually makes decisions about the quality of works of art and other objects and their 
value which is binding on Revenue Canada and which has significant tax ramifications.62 Like the 
proposed Tribunal, the Export Review Board makes hundreds of decisions every year with have 
direct consequences in terms of government tax revenue. That being the case, we think it is 
instructive to look at the statutory requirements for Board membership. 
 
Statutory Considerations in the Appointment of Tribunal Members 
 
 Under subsection 18(2) of the Cultural Property Export and Import Act, the Board is 
limited to ten people, though the appointments are on the recommendation of the Minister of 
                                                          
62 For example, property certified by the Board may be donated or sold to organizations also designated as 
meeting certain qualitative criteria by the Board, and the gift or sale will not attract any capital gains taxes. 
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Canadian Heritage. But up to four of the people must have backgrounds in galleries or museums 
while up to another four  come from amongst dealers or collector s of art and antiques. 
 
 While the existing statutory language could be improved upon, the model is one which 
can certainly be used in the case of a Tribunal. We could have a smaller board than, for example, 
the Standards Council that could have guidelines similar to those of the Charity Act (referred to 
earlier) and the Cultural Property Act. There could be a requirement of legal/accounting training, 
a history of employment in the sector and other criteria to be determined.  As we have noted, 
these specific requirements should not be finally determined until we have a better idea of the 
overall role the Tribunal will is to play. But the point we want to emphasize is that it is possible to 
draft legislation which “guarantees” representation from the various “players” and also tries to 
ensure a threshold level of expertise and experience. 
 
 In summary, we believe that the  Board of the Tribunal (for lack of better terminology) 
should be comparatively small (say 5 to 11) and chosen for a combination (either in any 
individual or as a group) of technical and sectoral experience. We believe that the process should 
include an application procedure, an independent non-political selection process and a set of 
statutory guidelines.  
 
Tribunal Staff 
 
 Turning to the issue of staff, there is a potential quandary which those people filling the 
positions will discover. The obvious source of new staff might be from amongst those currently 
employed in the Charities Division. The rationale would be that these people have already got 
some training and have a level of expertise in the field. 
 
 On the other hand, the concern we have expressed earlier in the paper is that the culture 
of the taxing authority is inappropriate in its influence of the decisions made about charitable 
determination.  This fact militates against a wholesale transfer of personnel from that authority. 
The question is simply whether the vast majority of the existing staff would maintain a “tax 
authority” perspective. 
 
 In a similar manner to the selection of the members of the Tribunal, we suggest an open 
employment process with all the positions advertised widely and publicly. Current employees of 
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the Charities Division would be specifically encouraged to apply if they have an interest in 
continuing to work in the field, but that there would be no preference given per se  because of 
their job status. Obviously, however, if they can show a level of expertise in the field which stems 
from having been in the Charities Division, this would be an asset. We would, however, 
recommend against any procedure which simply transferred all the employees from the Charities 
Division to the new organization without any selection procedure 
 
 We would see the employees of the new organization being “civil servants”, subject to 
the normal rules of the Public Service Commission, presumably unionized and with the ability to 
move fairly easily to more normal departments within the public service.63 On the other hand, all 
efforts should be made to recruit people who see work within the charity milieu  as a career goal, 
and not simply as a stepping stone up the employment ladder within the civil service. Once the 
Tribunal is well established, there should be an effort to promote from within while at the same 
time attempting to attract fresh blood with new perspectives on the issues being considered. 
 
 As a brief aside, we note that this approach to the creation of the Tribunal and to its 
staffing requirements would contribute to the building of capacity and strengthening of 
relationship of the voluntary sector with government, a matter the Joint Tables addressed.  The 
movement of personnel between public and private sector is well-known and appreciated for the 
perspectives that it brings to institutions in both spheres.  Developing stable career opportunities 
in an independent working environment within the overall government apparatus would over 
time, we believe, significantly contribute to the same exchange of personnel with the voluntary 
sector. 
 
 While we believe that a body like the Public Service Commission should be in charge of 
staffing (after taking into account the perceived needs as set out by the Board of the Tribunal) 
those Board members should have an active role in selecting senior staff. If the Board members 
are of the quality and experience which we believe the processes we have outlined will produce,  
then they will be uniquely qualified to assess the applicants for senior positions. 
                                                          
63 It might be useful to look at how the transition was done from a government department to an “agency” 
when Revenue Canada became the Canada Customs and Revenue Agency. While it is true that all 
employees of Revenue Canada on October 31 woke up and found themselves as employees of the CCRA 
on November 1, 1999, one of the rationales for creating the new organizations was to give more 
“flexibility” in personnel and compensation issues than exists in the bulk of the public service. By the time 
the government is able to move on the creation of a Tribunal, we may have some better guidance relating to 
possible human resource options. 
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 We would make one further observation, one as to timing. If, as we believe, it is not 
desirable to simply transfer existing Charity Division staff to the new organization,  we believe 
that there will have to be a period of overlapping existence of both the Charity Division and the 
Tribunal. We believe that the Tribunal will need some time to establish itself, both in terms of the 
mechanical issues ranging from getting physical space, equipment and staff to the more 
fundamental matters of developing policy. It seems to us that for a period of six months to a year, 
there be an overlap in existence. During this time, while the Tribunal is getting itself established, 
the Charities Division will continue to function.  
 
Communications and Confidentiality 
 
 We made much, earlier in this paper, about the problems created by the restrictions under 
the Income Tax Act 64 designed (quite properly in our view) to limit access to taxpayer 
information. Though the provisions are riddled with exceptions to the rule, including special rules 
relating to charities 65 the fact that the system is not geared to be “information friendly”. 
 
 Reflecting the different nature of Revenue Canada as administrator, in contrast to a 
Tribunal in a quasi-judicial judicial role, Revenue Canada, for example, never explains why it 
registers a particular organization (or even admits that it does so), though of course it does 
publish generalized information. The English Commission actually has published five “volumes” 
(slender ones, to be sure) explaining what it has done in certain types of cases, and why. It is 
currently involved in a very public process which goes under the name  of “examining The 
                                                          
64 See section 241 of the ITA. 
 
65 Subsection 241( 3.2) states: 
 
(3.2) Registered charities — An official may provide to any person the following taxpayer information 
relating to a charity that at any time was a registered charity: 
 (a) a copy of the charity's governing documents, including its statement of purpose; 
 (b) any information provided in prescribed form to the Minister by the charity on applying for registration 
under this Act; 
 (c) the names of the persons who at any time were the charity's directors and the periods during which they 
were its directors; 
 (d) a copy of the notification of the charity's registration, including any conditions and warnings; and 
 (e) if the registration of the charity has been revoked, a copy of any letter sent by or on behalf of the 
Minister to the charity relating to the grounds for the revocation.” 
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Register” but which is nothing less than a public consultation on a re-writing (albeit 
administratively) of the English and Wales definition of charities. 
 
 As we have suggested, one of the major advantages inherent in transferring federal 
administration and determination about charities from Revenue Canada to a new body, lies in the 
opportunity for the public to be made better aware of the process of registration and 
deregistration, the rules which are followed, the guidelines used as well as a provision of 
establishing public precedents in cases where similar organizations have been recognized as 
charitable. 
 
 In effect, the new organization would be in a position to create its own rules on access 
and confidentiality without statutory constraints. It is worth noting that while this is the case in 
England, there are unwritten internal guidelines, usually based on common sense. A series of 
questions we posed in interviews 66 about what would or would not be disclosed to members of 
the public in answers to queries elicited responses which amounted to “it depends”, and to a great 
extent the issue was whether in the view of the Commission the questioner had a legitimate 
interest in getting an answer. While this might not appeal to the new Canadian organization, the 
fact of the matter is that there are few legal constraints 67 in England on this issue and common 
sense seems to be the guiding principle. 
 
 But there is, we suggest, a big difference between issues of confidentiality about specific  
files which are still being considered (either for registration or deregistration) and secretiveness 
about what has already been decided, either in terms of a particular file or in terms of policy. It 
seems illogical that the Canadian public can get the public information return of any particular 
charity, the name of which it knows, but will get no help in trying to identify charities within a 
group. 
 
 We also do not understand why the names of organizations which are already registered 
cannot be divulged and their applications used as precedents. If one looks at the new found ability 
for Revenue Canada to divulge information under the provisions of subsection 241(3.2), the 
                                                          
66 Separate interviews with Michael Carpenter, the “legal “ Commissioner and with Kenneth Dibble, the 
most senior  law officer. 
 
67 Which do apply, in England as in Canada, where questions are posed to Inland Revenue.  
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problem is clear. If one knows the name of a particular registered charity which is working in a 
specific field, then information may be available.68 But if you ask Revenue first about the name a 
charity in the field of interest, it can’t be given under current legislative constraints. 
 
 At the very least, we would expect that the new organization would consider the 
following: 
 
• Expand the internet search engine to allow searches of registered organizations by key words 
linked to filed purposes and activities. 
• Make all documents in a file available to public search, excluding only such documents 
which relate to ongoing issues which the Tribunal is considering. 
• An annual report on the Tribunal’s activities. 
• A regular report of decisions of the Tribunal with an emphasis on “why” such decisions were 
take, both in cases of registration and refusals to register. 
• The issuing of press releases when issues relating to a charity surface in the media providing 
that the issue in question relates to the Tribunal’s jurisdiction. 
• Inviting public discussion on issues of concern to the Tribunal including the appropriateness 
of certain registrations.69 
• The publication of precedents. 
• The issuing of user friendly guidelines on registration, what types of organizations are 
eligible and the legal obligations of registered organization. 
 
 At this juncture it is impossible to determine the exact level of public disclosure which 
might be appropriate except to say that it is necessary that the level (and speed) of disclosure be 
better than at the present time. It will be for the members of the Tribunal to decide, as a high 
priority but presumably unencumbered by statute (except of course, perhaps for an mandatory 
annual report) what level of disclosure is appropriate and how it will be done.  
 
 The most important point is that the bias must be in favour of greater disclosure about the 
workings of the Tribunal and its processes of decision-making, as well as about organizations 
which have been registered. Here we echo and endorse the theme of the Joint Tables that the 
institution involved in the determination and oversight of charities of the federal level needs to be 
                                                          
68 The actual workings of the provisions are something else. Our experience in the first year of operations 
is that it was exceedingly difficult to actually get information and time was certainly not of the essence. At 
other times, we were told that while Revenue must provide information  in “prescribed form” under 
paragraph (b), the organization’s statement of activities, a crucial document in any application, was not on 
prescribed form and thus not available. This interpretation is typical of the mind-set of many of the 
bureaucrats at Revenue, an attitude of unhelpfulness which must be changed. 
69 Right now, the Charity Division receives many such submissions about registration or deregistration 
files but in most cases will not even acknowledge that the files exist. The extent to which the submissions 
have an impact is not known. Opening up or formalizing the process may or may not be desirable, but it an 
issue that the Tribunal should grapple with. 
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independent and transparent in its operations.  Difficulties will arise in the case of refusals to 
register and deregister charities. There will be a need to balance the public interest in knowing 
what is happening with the right of the organization to some level of confidentiality. An 
independent organization with known procedures and standards will contribute greatly to the 
acceptance of those decisions as having been fairly made. 
 
Intra-Governmental Relations 
 
 It goes without saying that the Tribunal will have to be in regular contact with other 
government departments, in particular Revenue Canada and Finance, but also with some of the 
central agencies and perhaps other departments which have “client” interest. For the most part, 
the contact procedures need not be formalized in statute and presumably will be developed 
mutually in discussions between the Tribunal and the departments. 
 
 We would assume that there are well established procedures to deal with everything from 
budgeting to staffing, pensions to accommodation, which would be implemented once the 
Tribunal is established and is in the process of becoming operational. 
 
 If the recommendation is accepted that Revenue Canada retain the function of auditing 
registered charities, then it will be necessary that there be an amendment to subsection 241(4) of 
the Income Tax Act. which allows Revenue to provide a whole range of entities (other 
departments, provincial governments and so forth) with tax information without contravening the 
confidentiality provisions of the Act..70 
 
 We would also anticipate that there would be very regular, weekly if not more frequent, 
contact between the Audit Division of Revenue Canada and the Tribunal and we would expect 
that audits would be done both according to Revenue Canada’s own norms but also on request 
from the Tribunal. 
 
 But the Tribunal will also want to be able to communicate with Revenue and Finance 
(and perhaps other departments) about policies which are being developed and about specific 
                                                          
70 There is an equivalent and very broad provision giving similar effect in section 10 of The Charity Act, 
1993. 
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applications which are being considered. In a communication to us, Kenneth Dibble, the Chief 
legal officer of the English Charities Commission, (later discussed in a personal interview with 
Mr. Dibble and with a representative of Inland Revenue, the British equivalent of Revenue 
Canada) outlined the approach used by the Commission 
 
 We believe the situation can be fairly summarized as follows: 
 
• The Commission and Inland Revenue agreed on guidelines which would determine the types 
of specific cases and situations which would merit the Commission bringing them to the 
attention of Inland Revenue.71 In any given year, the number of cases would probably be less 
than 30. 
• Inland Revenue gives its view on whether these organizations should be registered using 
common law tests as they or their legal counsel understand them. They do not base their 
support or opposition on such matters as the potential cost to the Treasury.72 
• Both parties agreed that the final decision was always that of the Commission. But Inland 
Revenue can appeal73 a decision into the courts if it feels very strongly. 74 We are proposing 
that Revenue Canada will have a similar right to launch an appeal. 
• When the issues relate not to files but to broader policy issue (as is happening now with the 
Review of the Register exercise, the main contact is with another part of Inland Revenue.75 
 
 In our view, similar arrangements, the creation of mutually agreed guidelines and the 
ability to confer and consult, will have to be put in place, not only with Revenue Canada  but also 
with Finance, at least insofar as policy issues are concerned. The Tribunal will also want to 
develop a process whereby it can easily consult with other government departments where those 
departments’ expertise and interests may be of use in helping the Tribunal to set policy and to 
make determinations about specific files.  
 
                                                          
71 These cases would likely go to the Financial Intermediaries and Claims Office (FICO). 
 
72 The interviewer expressed some polite scepticism but was assured by both interviews (speaking at 
different times and places and not in each other’s company) that this was indeed the case. 
 
73 Dibble stressed that in truth, there is no “appeal” but a trial de novo to which the Commission is not a 
party! 
 
74 See I.R.C. v. McMullen, [1981] AC 1 for example holding that the support of  sporting facilities in 
schools and universities is charitable under the head of “education” even though support of sports generally 
is not considered to be charitable.  
 
75 The Capital and Savings Division. The two branches of Inland Revenue also liase on subjects, be they 
files or policy, which they think might be of mutual interest. 
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 The relationship with Finance will be most important for two reasons. First, the 
decisions of the Tribunal may have an impact on revenues in that each registration may mean that 
there will be incrementally more tax-receipted donations made. And there may be policy 
decisions which will have significant impact. 
 
 Second, the record suggests that Finance has been wary when it comes to amending 
tax legislation which deals with charities (as opposed to charitable donations). We anticipate that 
the Tribunal will develop considered opinions as to the changes which, in its view, are required. 
We would anticipate that as a matter of course, a procedure would be put in place to allow an 
exchange each year, or earlier, as required. 
 
 We would suggest that set procedures and guidelines be established to allow regular 
contact with Finance as with the case of Revenue. We would also suggest (though it is far outside 
our purview) that consideration might be given to having one or more officers at Finance 
designated as contacts with the Tribunal and that procedures be put in place there to ensure that 
the Tribunal’s concerns are given serious consideration. 
 
The Nature of the Charity Tribunal - Its Legal Basis and Role 
 
 Having made our  case for a Charity Tribunal as the most appropriate method by 
which to determine and administer charities under the Income Tax Act, we now turn to a more 
detailed consideration of the nature of the Tribunal, its legal basis and the role we see it playing.  
 
 In this discussion we are concerned with central elements of administrative law, 
dealing as those do with the legal limits on the actions of government officials, and on the 
remedies which are provided to those who are affected by the failure to observe lawful limits. As 
we are concerned with identifying the best means by which the decision about what constitutes a 
charity is made, we are also concerned about the lawful authority for any particular act.  This 
leads directly to the question of review or appeals. 
 
General Considerations 
 
 We believe that the requirements for independence, specialized knowledge and the 
related functions of adjudication, policy formulations and, potentially, rule-making, taken 
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together suggest the need for a specialized administrative tribunal authorized by specific 
legislation.  We do not believe that, in the first instance, the court is the appropriate forum for the 
efficient, effective determination of what constitutes a charity for the purposes of the Income Tax 
Act.  Given the numbers of cases involved, a court is ill-suited to the task of high-volume 
adjudication.  The various elements of what constitutes legal charity requires that specialized 
expertise be brought to bear.  
 
 Moreover the traditional adversarial process inherent in our courts does not lend 
itself, we believe, to the consideration of broad range of factors necessary to give life to the often 
stated principal that the notion of charity is an ever-evolving concept.  Finally court procedures 
are not flexible enough to respond to the adjudicative requirements of the determination of charity 
under the Income Tax Act. 
 
 We believe that the Charity Tribunal should be conceived as having two elements: an 
administrative function performed by a registration division headed by a Registrar and an 
adjudication function., carried out by the Board of the Tribunal  Many, if not most, applications 
for charitable registration under The Income Tax Act would be determined by reference to the 
existing body of law. The Registrar would administer that law and would make administrative 
decisions as to whether any particular applicant is and will operate as a charity.  In a limited 
number of cases the Registrar will have doubt.  Those applications would be rejected, with the 
Registrar having the ability (on notice to the applicant) to seek a determination of the Board of 
the Tribunal, sitting in its adjudicative capacity.  As well, notice of that consideration would be 
given to presumably interested parties, such as Revenue Canada, other government departments 
or outsiders whom the Board thinks might usefully be heard. 
 
 At the hearing, the Registrar would appear, not in adversarial capacity but in the 
nature of an amicus curiae. It’s function that would be to provide an information brief to the 
Board of the Tribunal setting out the state of the law giving rise to the Registrar’s rejection.  On 
the other hand, Revenue Canada, where it chooses to do so, or other parties could appear in a 
more adversarial role laying out its reasons why the current law should be applied so as to deny 
status. The applicant would take its own position.  All submissions could be in writing, or at the 
option of the Tribunal, a hearing could be convened. 
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 A decision by the Charity Tribunal could be subject to an appeal  to court by either 
the rejected applicant or by Revenue Canada.  We suggest that in the first instance the Tax Court 
of Canada be used for a de novo hearing, with a further statutory appeal, having regard to the 
broad underlying legal principles for consideration, to the Federal Court Canada.   
 
 We believe that this formulation is consistent with what is required to advance the 
identified requirements of independence and the specialized knowledge required for adjudication, 
policy formulation, and potential rule-making.  As has been noted, these bodies can be 
empowered to exercise one, some or all of the following functions:  
 
(a)  Adjudication – the act of decision-making.  
 
(b)  Policy making – the making of policy choices which may be reflected in 
adjudicative decisions, subordinate legislation, or policy statements issued to 
assist in the administration of a scheme 
 
(c)  Rule making – the making of subordinate legislation to reflect policy choices 
necessary to the effective administration of the scheme.  
 
(d)  Enforcement – action taken to compel compliance with adjudicative or 
policy decisions.  
 
(e)  Research – the identification and study of problems and issues associated 
with a particular aspect of government administration.  
 
(f)  Investigation –  an inquiry into the existence of certain facts associated with 
the resolution of a dispute, a complaint or the satisfaction of a claim.  
 
(g)  Prosecution – the institution of proceedings against those thought to 
contravene the legal rules governing the operation of a particular governmental 
scheme.  
 
(h)  Advising – the giving of information and compliance advice. 
 
  We believe that the tribunal, in its initial formulation, should only address the matters 
contemplated by (a), (b) and (h).  But in considering the nature of the organization and 
formulating its constituent elements, sub-delegated rule-making authority should be considered 
for eventual inclusion in its mandate, in light of the anticipated necessity for policy formulation 
based on specialized expertise. 
 
  As the Charity Tribunal is clearly an administrative tribunal acting as decision maker 
under delegated authority, its decisions will be subject  to the developing body of administrative 
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law controls.  The need both to ensure that the Tribunal’s administrative actions are not beyond 
the scope of its authority and to acknowledge and enhance the specialized nature of determining 
what constitutes a charity for the purposes of the Income Tax Act, means that the task of devising 
the appropriate legal controls on the Charity Tribunal is a somewhat complex challenge and needs 
to be carefully considered. The balance of this part provides more detail about the function of the 
Registrar,  the composition of the Tribunal, its relationship to the Registrar and the role and 
nature of reviews by way of reconsideration and appeals. In canvassing these areas the related 
matters of third party interest and costs will be addressed. In presenting this formulation, it details 
as to compliance periods and related matters are suggested as examples of the administrative 
considerations which we suggest are necessary to specify so as to ensure that the overall objective 
of transparent, independent adjudication is met. 
 
The Registrar 
 
  The Registrar performs the function of receiving applications and considering them 
in accordance with guidelines established by the board of the Tribunal.  At this stage we also see, 
in keeping with our earlier observations about relations with other government departments, the 
need to have an obligation on the Registrar to circulate applications to other interested 
departments which raise contentious issues according to established protocols but which 
applications are likely to be approved. These protocols could be fashioned in regulation. 
 
  Once an application was complete, in a manner prescribed by Regulation, the 
Registrar would have 15 working days within which to accept or reject the application, in 
accordance with the Board of the Tribunal’s administrative guidelines. Any application not 
considered within fifteen business days would be deemed approved. 
 
  All applications would be reviewed by panel of the Board of the Tribunal, subject to 
the right of the Chair or Vice-Chair of the Board to constitute a larger hearing panel. For 
applications which the Registrar denies, if the Tribunal Board upholds the denial, notice would be 
given to the applicant inviting further representations. The applicant could request an appearance 
before the Board of the Tribunal or it can choose to make submissions entirely in writing.  
 
  All considerations by the Registrar would require a summary of the reasons for 
acceptance or rejection having regard to the administrative guidelines.  The Registrar would 
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appear at the consideration by the Board of the Tribunal, either by way of its summary of reasons 
or, at its option, by a representative of the Registrar’s staff. 
 
The Board of the Tribunal  
 
  Given the administrative relationship we envisage between the Registrar and what we 
are calling the Board of the Tribunal, we believe that the following formulation of jurisdiction 
constitutes the appropriate basis for the decision-making function of the Board. This statutory 
basis would be found in amendments to the Income Tax Act. 
 
There is constituted the Charity Tribunal of Canada. The 
Tribunal has exclusive jurisdiction to determine all questions of 
fact and law relating to charity, as that term is used in the 
Income Tax Act, subject to consideration by the Tax Court of 
Canada and appeals to the Federal Court of Canada as provided 
in section [] . 
 
  In the administration of this sort of regulatory scheme, we have suggested that an 
emphasis be placed on special expertise and independent decision-making.  This will require 
expertise in matters other than law. As an expert tribunal, insulated from political pressures, a 
tribunal empowered with this form of jurisdiction would, in our view, advance the requirements 
we have outlined. And, given that the tribunal would operate without the full arsenal of the 
adversarial process, it would be able to inform itself with of broad range of relevant factors, 
admitted into evidence as it determines, so as to advance the requirement of registering charities. 
 
  We suggest that the Board of the Tribunal should have a chair and two vice-chairs.  
These would be full-time appointments.  The remaining members of the Board of the Tribunal 
would be part-time appointments.  In keeping with our earlier observations that offices of the 
Tribunal might exist in a number of locations in the country, we suggest that a pool of qualified 
part-time appointees be constituted in the various regions.  Every panel of the Tribunal would 
have one of the chair or vice-chair and two other members sitting. This formulation would also 
allow the chair to address questions of conflict of interest. The chair or a vice chair would have 
the prerogative to constitute a larger hearing panel should that be appropriate to the matter under 
consideration. 
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Further Consideration and Appeals 
 
  One of the most important features of establishing an independent decision-making 
tribunal is to allow it to develop a body of rules which are known and clear.  But acting as an 
instrument of delegated authority, the tribunal must be subject to appropriate review of its 
decisions and jurisdiction.  In recent years the courts have developed a range of review criteria. 
We suggest that a review function be established, having regard to the need for superior court 
review weighed against costs to the parties and the time involved in affecting amounts to 
appellate review. 
 
  Bearing these notions in mind, we suggest that where the Board of the Tribunal 
denies an application at the hearing stage, notice with reasons be sent to the applicant within 
fifteen business days of the hearing. The notice would invite the applicant to elect either the 
informal procedure under the Tax Court Rules or the formal procedure.   The jurisdiction of the 
Tax Court would be a de novo consideration.  The parties to the hearing would be the Attorney 
General of Canada and the applicant. The Tribunal could be represented at a hearing, though a 
similar fashion to Labour Board practice in some jurisdictions, representative of the Tribunal 
appearing in an informational role only and not as a party. 
 
  If the Tax Court upheld the denial, the applicant would have a further appeal to the 
Federal Court of Canada, at its own expense.  The review by the Federal Court would be an 
appellate one, on the record and without the opportunity to call evidence except in accordance 
with the rules of the Federal Court. If the Tax Court approved the application, notice would be 
given to Revenue Canada and to any other government department having a potential interest in 
the matter and to the Tribunal.  If any of those interested parties chose to advance in appeal, the 
Attorney General acting for Canada would give notice to the applicant of its intention to appeal.  
In that case, costs of the appeal would be costs borne by Canada, subject to a regulation as to 
schedule of fees and disbursements, in the normal way. 
 
 We also think that serious thought should be given to establishing a list of approved counsel 
who would be willing to act for needy litigants where counsel is unavailable and the applicant is 
without funds.  It might be that this authority should be given to the Tribunal to appoint from the 
list where a needy application matter raises issues of concern calling for council familiar with 
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charities issues.  This charity law list could be established on a regional basis on application by 
interested lawyers with fees and cost set in a similar fashion to the schedule established for 
Federal Court appeals. 
 
 A word is in order about onus in the appeal process. As we noted earlier in this paper, appeals 
under the Income Tax Act automatically put the onus on the taxpayer/appellant in ant litigation. 
We have taken the position that the appropriate approach in considering charity cases under the 
new regime is that there should be a presumption that the activities on question are charitable 
unless it can be demonstrated that they are not. This being the case, we take the position that on 
appeal, the onus is on the Tribunal, Revenue Canada or any party opposing registration (or 
supporting deregistration) to meet the necessary burden of proof…in effect shifting the onus from 
where it stands today. 
 
 A final word about deregistration. Charities may be deregistered for many reasons. In 
situations where the deregistration is at the request of the charity, the deregistration should be 
carried on at the registration level. 
 
 Where the deregistration is for “mechanical” reasons such as the failure to file returns, the 
deregistration notice should be issued by the registration branch with some sort time frame 
allowed for the organization to launch an appeal to the Tribunal itself. 
 
 On the other hand, where the deregistration is based on an alleged breach of the Income Tax 
Act (other than a “mechanical” failure) or on the basis that the charity no longer carries on 
charitable activities, deregistration should come only after the Charity has had an opportunity to 
make a formal submission (similar in nature to what would occur after a refusal to register) to the 
Board of the Tribunal, with a subsequent appeal into the Court system if the Board upheld the 
deregistration. 
 
Conclusion 
 
We believe that the time has come in the evolution of the administrative and legal 
framework of charities under the Income Tax Act for an independent decision-making and 
supervisory body to be constituted.  The existing arrangement which sees the Charities Division 
of Revenue Canada administer a body of rules which is modified only slowly and with extreme 
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expense is inadequate.  The Division is put in the conflicting position of being the legislated 
administrator but also an adjudicator without jurisdiction. To that situation has been added a 
method of appealing decisions which is unduly complex, protracted and expensive. All of this 
occurs within the context of a taxing authority. 
 
We believe that the creation of an independent quasi-judicial administrative tribunal with 
clear, legislated jurisdiction, independent appointments capable of hearings throughout the 
country and a process to both administratively determine qualification and adjudicate the status of 
difficult cases will address the significant current problems associated with determining 
charitable status under the Income Tax Act. Specifying clear procedural deadlines, including a 
mechanism for deemed approvals and review, would establish the administrative framework 
which could properly and expeditiously deal with the cases put to it.  
  
Moreover, establishing a first level review process to the Tax Court with the applicant’s 
option to used the informal rules, would provide an appropriate oversight of the Tribunal’s work 
without significant impediment in time or cost to those seeking status. When this arrangement is 
coupled with adequate involvement of the tax authority, the tax policy authority and other arms of 
government, a facility is established which could both manage the decisions about status under 
the Income Tax Act and develop an enhanced expertise about the policy requirements necessary 
to a property regulate charities under the Income Tax Act in an on-going way.   
 
This paper has been written to assist those contemplating whether there should be a 
charity commission for Canada.  As we said at the outset, our view is that the question is not 
whether but how.  Moreover, we have found that so often in this kind of policy discussion a 
serious impediment to an adequate consideration of the unknown results from a real concern 
about the interaction of administrative and technical detail.  By fashioning a broad picture of what 
could be a Charity Tribunal of Canada and setting out an adequate measure of detail, we hope we 
offer a picture of the how which will move those still concerned with whether to take the next 
step.  We fear that without doing so the promise that charity as an evolving concept cannot be 
realized. 
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Appendix A 
 
Institutional Change 
 
Given the objectives of the regulatory framework for the voluntary sector and the need to make 
changes therein, the Regulatory Table has developed three models for the institutional or 
regulatory oversight arrangements: 
 
Model A: an enhanced Revenue Canada Charities Division (RCCD). 
 
Model B: an agency, somewhat similar to that proposed by the Broadbent Panel on 
Accountability and Governance in the Voluntary Sector. 
 
Model C: a commission, similar to the Charity Commission for England and Wales. 
 
Below is an outline, in broad terms, of the models’ core mandates. The current vision is that each 
would be a federal body. There is potential, however, to design structures in a way that would 
allow opting-in or some other type of coordination with provincial authorities. 
 
 
Model A: Enhanced Revenue Canada Charities Division (RCCD) 
 
The RCCD would retain its current authority for the administration of the Income Tax Act with 
respect to charities. The Divisions mandate, however, would be expanded to include 
responsibility for facilitating public access to information about charities, and responsibility to 
assist charities with registration and compliance with the law. 
 
The Division would be assisted by a committee, composed of individuals knowledgeable about 
charities and the law, that would advise on all aspects of the Division’s expanded mandate. In 
addition, charities would be able to request an administrative review within Revenue Canada of 
RCCD decisions. 
 
 
Model B: Agency 
 
The agency’s functions would complement those of Revenue Canada’s Charities Division. While 
the RCCD would still make the decisions, the agency would, at greater arms length than the 
advisory committee of model A, make recommendations on difficult cases, issue policy advice, 
and help organizations to comply with the regulator. 
 
As well, the agency would nurture and support charities and other voluntary organizations, and 
provide information to the public. This complements the option, outlined by the Table on Building 
a New Relationship, for an agency to nurture the relationship between the federal government 
and the voluntary sector. 
 
 
Model C: Commission 
 
A quasi-judicial commission would undertake most of the functions currently carried out by the 
Charities Division. It would provide authoritative advice to the voluntary sector, and expert 
adjudication of appeals on decisions by its Registrar. At the same time, such a commission would 
have a support function not unlike model B’s agency. 
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The Models’ Shared Assumptions 
 
The Table assumes that the following conditions would apply to all models: 
 
• The appeals process would be reformed. All three models contemplate the need for 
administrative, quasi-judicial and judicial review, the potential for greater access to appeals, and a 
richer accumulation of expertise by adjudicators. This would guide both the sector and those who 
administer this complex area of law. 
• Confidentiality restrictions around the registration process would be eased. 
• Any body mandated to oversee the sector should have sufficient resources and expertise 
to develop policy, educate and communicate. 
• There would be greater effort to foster knowledge of the rules and ensure compliance 
with them, including institution of intermediate penalties. 
 
 
Self-Regulation in the Models 
 
As a partial response to the need for change, self-regulation can be seen as having great merit. 
This is provided that no duplication of reporting requirements would be created if self-regulation 
became institutionalized. 
 
The potential and effect of increased self-regulation are similar in each model. 
 
 
Assessment of the Models 
 
Each of the three models was assessed with respect to the identified need for change, and with 
respect to a number of criteria: 
 
• the ability to improve the availability of public information and knowledge about the 
sector; 
• the potential for serving the non-charities part of the sector; 
• the ability to accommodate provincial involvement; 
• the compatibility of a support or nurturing function with other functions of the organization; 
• the effect on regulatory burden; 
• the degree of independence each would have from the government and the sector; 
• the ability to enhance the confidence and trust of the sector and public; and, 
• government control of costs. 
 
The chart on page 57 contains a comparison of each model according to the preceding criteria. 
Some related general comments are as follows: 
 
• Assumptions on reform of the appeal process, the easing of confidentiality restrictions 
and greater compliance support already implied that all models would see improved 
transparency around registration, more effort to ensure compliance (including institution 
of intermediate sanctions) and a more accessible appeal process. Hearings on 
controversial cases could be instituted under any model. 
• Compared with the current situation, all of the models would foster, to some extent, both 
the enabling and accountability objectives of the regulatory framework. 
• On several other criteria (improved public information and knowledge, enhanced 
confidence and trust by the sector), the differences between models are incremental, with 
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model C perhaps best situated to ensure public confidence. All models offer varying 
degrees in meeting these criteria. 
• The ability to accommodate provincial interests would be different under each model, but 
it is not immediately clear which model would work best. 
• The potential for serving the non-charitable voluntary sector is likely larger in models B 
and C. The agency in model B would perhaps have the greatest freedom to build 
partnerships and nurture the sector. The model C commission would likely have the 
greatest independence from both the government and the sector, and may therefore be 
able to integrate the compliance and nurturing functions most completely. 
 
While the Regulatory Table did not seek a full consensus on a preferred model, there was 
widespread support among voluntary sector members of the Table for moving regulatory 
oversight out of Revenue Canada. The Table saw greater merit in having integrated oversight 
rather than bifurcated responsibilities. The nurturing role that an agency could play, and the 
opportunities it could offer to enter into partnerships with other stakeholders, was seen as 
attractive. On balance, voluntary sector members of the Table favoured model C, while 
government members tended to conclude that any model could work. 
 
The Table did not extensively pursue the question of regulation of non-charities. The Table 
believes, however, that under any model, the oversight of “deemed charities" should be identical 
to and integrated with that of registered charities. 
 
Several other issues concerning change to the institutional framework could be further explored. 
These issues include regulation of the wide spectrum of not-for-profit organizations discussed 
previously, and governance issues such as the appointment and composition of a new oversight 
or advisory body. 
 
Assessment of the Models 
 
Goals/criteria A: an Enhanced RCCD B: an agency C: a commission 
Improved public 
information and 
knowledge about the 
sector. 
Website and other 
measures could make for 
improvement over the 
status quo. 
Could be more vigorous 
program than under A. 
Same as B. 
Potential for serving the 
non-charitable voluntary 
sector. 
Status quo. Yes, on a voluntary basis. 
The agency would be a 
more acceptable 
interface than RCCD. 
Yes, in that there are 
statutory obligations, and 
otherwise on a voluntary 
basis. The commission 
would be a more 
acceptable interface than 
RCCD. 
Ability to accommodate 
provincial involvement, 
including, potentially, 
coordinated regulation. 
The new Canada 
Customs and Revenue 
Agency has a Board with 
provincial 
representatives, 
Broader potential for 
provincial involvement on 
a partnership basis. 
Structures could be 
developed to 
accommodate provincial 
input more focussed on 
the charitable/voluntary 
sector. 
Compatibility with a 
support or nurturing 
function. 
In the final analysis, 
Revenue Canada will 
remain the “cop.” 
An agency would provide 
significant scope for this. 
Regulatory and support 
functions can live side by 
side, but the nurturing 
function is likely to be 
somewhat more 
restrained than under B. 
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Regulatory burden: 
-compliance cost; 
-efficiency/duplication, 
No change from the 
status quo (but see the 
suggestions on short-
form reporting on page 
58). 
Burden could be 
lightened as a result of 
preventive regulation 
functions, and assistance 
to individual groups on 
applications or with 
returns. 
Functioning of the 
commission would need 
to be carefully designed 
to ensure there is no 
increase in regulatory 
burden. 
Degree of independence 
from government and 
the sector 
- including clarity of 
roles. 
Same as now, except for 
profile of the advisory 
committee. 
The agency would be a 
friend of the sector. It 
would also have 
extensive working 
relationships with 
Revenue Canada. 
A commission would 
have greater 
independence from both 
government and the 
sector than either A or B. 
Enhancing sector 
confidence 
and trust in the 
regulator, e.g.: 
- working relationship; 
 
- respect for 
confidentiality; 
 
- objectivity of the 
appeals. 
Better working 
relationship than 
presently. 
Better working 
relationship than under A 
— to the extent that the 
agency succeeds in its 
role as representing the 
interests of the sector. 
May be better than both 
A and B (good working 
relationship, objective 
and confidential advice, 
independent appeal 
machinery). 
Enhancing the public’s 
confidence and trust. 
Better than presently. Role may be difficult for 
the general public to 
understand. 
Same as A. 
Government control of 
costs. 
Government remains in 
control. 
Government retains 
control, but the agency, 
through its 
recommendations on 
(de)registration and 
through its policy advice, 
would still be in a position 
to push at the edges. 
Within the four corners of 
common law and 
statutory definitions, the 
commission may see 
room for both narrower 
and wider interpretations, 
possibly resulting in a net 
gradual expansion of 
eligibility. 
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Appendix B 
 
Two Statutory Board Models From Federal Legislation 
 
 
1. Standards Council of Canada 
 
COUNCIL ESTABLISHED 
3. A corporation is hereby established, to be known as the Standards Council of Canada, consisting of the 
following members:  
(a) a person employed in the public service of Canada to represent the Government of Canada; 
(b) the Chairperson and Vice-Chairperson of the Provincial-Territorial Advisory Committee established 
under subsection 20(1); 
(c) the Chairperson of the Standards Development Organizations Advisory Committee established under 
subsection 21(1); and 
(d) not more than eleven other persons to represent the private sector ,including non-governmental 
organizations. 
 
Appointment of members of Council 
 
6. (1) Each member of the Council, other than the persons referred to in paragraphs 3(b) and (c), shall be 
appointed by the Governor in Council, on the recommendation of the Minister, to hold office during 
pleasure for such term not exceeding three years as will ensure, as far as possible, the expiration in anyone 
year of the terms of office of not more than one half of the members.  
 
Requirements 
(2) The members of the Council referred to in paragraph 3(d) must be representative of a broad spectrum of 
interests in the private sector and have the knowledge or experience necessary to assist the Council in the 
fulfilment of its mandate. 
No right to vote 
(3) The member of the Council referred to in paragraph 3(c) is a non-voting member of the Council. 
R.S., 1985, c. S-16, s. 6; R.S., 1985, c. 1 (4th Supp.), s. 33; 1996, c. 24, s.5.  
 
Designation of Chairperson and Vice-Chairperson 
 
7. (1) A Chairperson of the Council and a Vice-Chairperson of the Council shall each be designated by the 
Governor in Council from among the members of the Council to hold office during pleasure for such term 
as the Governor in Council considers appropriate. 
 
2. Cultural Property Export and Import Act 
 
Review Board established 
18. (1) There is hereby established a board to be known as the Canadian Cultural Property Export Review 
Board, consisting of a Chairperson and not more than nine other members appointed by the Governor in 
Council on the recommendation of the Minister. 
Members 
(2) The Chairperson and one other member shall be chosen generally from among residents of Canada, and 
(a) up to four other members shall be chosen from among residents of Canada who are or have been 
officers, members or employees of art galleries, museums, archives, libraries or other similar 
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institutions in Canada; and 
(b) up to four other members shall be chosen from among residents of Canada who are or have been 
dealers in or collectors of art, antiques or other objects that form part of the national heritage. 
 
Acting Chairperson 
(3) The Review Board may authorize one of its members to act as Chairperson in the event of the absence 
or incapacity of the Chairperson or if the office of Chairperson is vacant.  
Quorum 
(4) Three members, at least one of whom is a person described in paragraph(2)(a) and one of whom is a 
person described in paragraph (2)(b), constitute a quorum of the Review Board. 
R.S., 1985, c. C-51, s. 18; 1995, c. 29, ss. 21, 22(E). 
Remuneration  
19. (1) Each member of the Review Board who is not an employee of, or an employee of an agent of, Her 
Majesty in right of Canada or a province shall be paid such salary or other amount by way of remuneration 
as may be fixed by the Governor in Council. 
Expenses 
(2) Each member of the Review Board is entitled, within such limits as may be established by the Treasury 
Board, to be paid reasonable travel and living expenses incurred while absent from his ordinary place of 
residence in connection with the work of the Review Board. 
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Appendix C 
 
The Cultural Property Review Board: Potential Precedent and Model 
 
 One of the generalized concerns which we have heard voiced over the past year or so 
when there has been a discussion of the possible implementation of a “charity commission” in 
Canada has been the issue of power over tax-related matters. Simply put, the question is whether 
an arm’s length body should make decisions which have a cost to the federal government in terms 
of reduced tax revenues? 
 
 It is worth keeping in mind that such a model already exists and that over the past twenty or more 
years, the government has not only not restricted its powers but has actually enhanced them, incorporating 
those powers within the Income Tax Act. 
 
 The Cultural Property Review Board, created under the Cultural Property Import and Export Act 
has extensive powers which can affect tax revenues of the Federal and provincial governments. 
 
 The Board has the following powers: 
• It can certify objects to be “cultural property” for Income Tax act (and export ) purposes. 
• Cultural property which is donated or sold to a “designated institution” escapes capital gains tax 
completely. 
• Gifted cultural property can reduce tax liability of a donor for up to 100% of annual income with a five 
year carry forward of the excess. 
• The Board can designate institutions which are eligible to receive such property. 
• The Board certifies the value of such property and the assigned value is “deemed” to be fair market 
value under the Income Tax Act, binding upon the donor and Revenue Canada, though the donor has 
an appeal right. (This is a newish power given to the Board five or six years ago.) Revenue Canada 
can, however, challenge other aspects of the donation, such as whether it is a gift of capital property. 
• The Board has funds available which it can give to an institution to allow it to purchase objects which 
are certified 
 
Aside and apart from certain extremely vague statutory guides, the Board sets its own rules with regard 
to determining what is cultural property and which institutions will be designated. 
 
While the Board is appointed by the government, its nine members need not be (and usually does not 
include) government representatives. Rather, four are drawn from the institutional community (museums 
and galleries) while four come from the private sector…collectors, appraisers and dealers, as is required by 
statute. The Board has been, for the most part, free of political appointees and is well respected by all 
sectors for its work. 
 
The Board has worked closely with Revenue Canada on certain problems (such as “art flips”) and has 
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created some rules to help the Department, while at the same time operating essentially at arm’s length. 
 
 All costs, including administrative costs, remuneration for Board members and staff (who are 
public servants) support services and expenses are borne by the government. The Board issues an annual 
Report which is a public documents describing its work and discussing some of its more significant 
decisions. The Board has specific powers to hire experts and appraisers, and the government underwrites 
the cost. 
 
 The point here is two-fold. 
 
 First, the Board in effect “costs” the federal government tens of millions of dollars a year by 
certifying property for Income Tax act purposes. This cost, of course, is in forgone tax revenue. It operates 
completely outside other government constraints including budgetary constraints based on deficit fighting. 
There is no limit on the number of objects the Board may certify in any given year. 
 
 Second, the Board is reflective of the two communities which are most interested in its work…the 
institutional community which will get gifts and make purchases of cultural property and the collectors and 
gallery owners who usually have title to such items. Only once in its twenty-five year history has the Chair 
been a civil servant by profession and in this case, he had been retired after a career which mostly was 
“culturally” oriented. 
 
 Thus, we have a model of an effective arm’s length body, funded by the federal government, 
which has a substantial role in making decisions which are income tax related. In a broad sense, this would 
be akin to the role a charity commission might have under at least one of the options which is under 
consideration. 
 
